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This Occasional Paper presents a summary of research conducted in the project
entitled "State Intervention For Growth Promotion in Market Economies" undertaken
by the Institute of Public Finance and financed by the Croatian Chamber of
Commerce. The complete collection of papers written for the project was published in
the Institute’s journal "Financijska praksa", Volume 19, Number 5 (February 1996).
The project's lead researcher was Ms Marina Kesner Škreb. The papers were  written
by Ms. Dubravka Jurlina Alibegoviæ and Ms. ￿eljka Kordej De Villa (Economics
Institute, Zagreb), Ms. Danijela Kuliš, Ms. Marina Kesner Škreb and Dr. Katarina Ott
(Institute of Public Finance), Dr. Mia Mikiæ (University of Auckland, Auckland). The
project's consultant was Dr. Ivo Biæaniæ (Faculty of Economics, Zagreb and Central
European University, Budapest) who also made the English translation. The purpose
of the project was to analyze the experiences of industrial policies in selected market
economies. The results of the research would then be used as background papers for




The purpose of the project was to analyze how state intervention, or, more
precisely industrial policy, influences market economies. The countries selected
for case studies were: Austria, Chile, the European Union, Germany, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan. At the end of the project there is a brief
review of the present industrial policy in Croatia. The research indicated the
following conclusions as policy recommendations for Croatia:
* All the countries under consideration have conducted industrial policies over a
long period of time so it seems that an industrial policy is a unavoidable building
block of every market economy;
* Industrial policy has undergone a transformation from a targeted policy to one
relying on horizontal measures;
* Targeted industrial policies are aimed at directly supporting selected industrial
sectors (either "national champions" or "lame ducks"). Generally this policy has
not proved successful. The state administration has not shown itself to be capable
of successfully choosing and effectively supporting chosen sectors;
* An increasing number of economists agree that industrial policy should rely on
horizontal policies, i.e. those aimed at supporting key inputs (e.g. invest in
infrastructure, finance labour re-qualification schemes, develop information
networks for financial markets, support research and development, support
environmental protection, etc.). Such interventions benefit all market agents and
lead to least relative price distortions;
* Even horizontal state intervention must be limited in time, must consider all
costs and benefits, must be as transparent as possible  and must distort relative
prices as little as possible.STATE  INTERVENTION FOR GROWTH PROMOTION IN MARKET
ECONOMIES
“It is in fact easy to offer a justification for industrial policy...
The difficult questions are  how to implement such a policy in practice, and how to




The project sought to analyze how developed market economies used state
intervention to achieve, increase and facilitate economic restructuring. Since state
interventionism covers a wide scope of economic activities performed by the state, for
the purpose of this project the  scope of state intervention was narrowed. It includes
the study of industrial policies, i.e. the policies for sectoral resource allocation
management aimed at the achievement of high growth and employment rates. Some
economies were more successful in this than others. Drawing both from recent
research results and individual country experience, the project attempted to define the
necessary ingredients for a successful industrial policy.
As the summary of the research project this paper has two parts. The first provides a
survey of the theoretical underpinning of industrial policies. This section deals with
the historical development of industrial policy and the policy recommendations for
Croatia. The second part surveys the industrial policy experience of Austria, Chile,
European Union, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan with a
brief  survey of industrial policies currently being implemented in Croatia.
I. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS
1. Which industrial policy is the best?
Many economists have tried to answer this question. Most agree that reasons for
industrial policy can be found in market failures (positive and negative externalities,
economies of scale, asymmetric information). Even many liberal minded economistsagree that market failures provide sufficient cause for adopting an industrial policy
which will remedy failures and lead the economy to a higher efficiency level.
Extensive state intervention and industrial policies are a feature of the period from the
Second World War onwards. At the same time there have been ongoing discussions in
the professions regarding the most appropriate form of industrial policy. The two
opposing camps were the "structuralist" and "liberal". Structuralists argued in favour
of a targeted industrial policy and the consequent need to pick and choose which
sectors and/or industries to support and then design redistribution of scarce resources
along those lines. Liberal economists took the opposite view and were thus more
inclined to a hands-off approach and considered industrial policies can only be used
when necessary.
In the beginning the philosophy and practice of structuralism dominated together with
its policies of picking winners and supporting lame duck industries. Slowly this
practice is being abandoned. The current practice of industrial policy is changing as
the opinions of structuralists and liberals converge. Thus in the OECD and EU
economies it is now generally accepted that an industrial policy should not get
involved in the market mechanism, instead it should  increase the market's efficiency
through horizontal policies. Horizontal policies are those which seek to increase the
quality of key production inputs (education, research and development,
telecommunications, etc.). Through such measures policy makers in these economies
seek to improve the general economic environment and produce effects benefiting all
market actors. Such a market oriented industrial policy does not deform the allocation
of resources and reduces state intervention to its lowest possible level.
This new approach to industrial policy is a result of economic globalization and the
intense international competition it has led to. The business strategy of multinational
corporation led to a new phase of development of international economic relations
which has been referred to as globalization. This trend has been supported by
developments in telecommunications. Its main feature are networks of transnational
companies which have organized their activities over a wide area covering more than
one national economy. In such circumstances the goals of transnational companies
and national governments do not always coincide. The national identity of companies
becomes even more blurred when ownership, production and plants are scattered overthe globe. Products become combinations of components whose source is difficult to
determine. In such a business environment funds from targeted industrial policies can
easily end up in the pockets of foreign companies instead of intended national
champions.
Parallel to the shift towards horizontal policies most economies in the world
experienced a reduction of state aid from the relatively high levels of the seventies.
For example, in the European Union average state aid in the 1986-88 period was 2.2%
of GDP, in 1988-90 the average was 2.0% of GDP and in 1990-92 the average fell to
1.9% of GDP (Commission of the EC, 1990, 1992, 1995). In all OECD economies
during the 1985-88 period aggregate state aid was 2.7% of GDP but between 1986
and 1989 it fell by 36%, i.e. from 75 mil. to 55 mil USD (OECD, 1992).
2.  Why is targeted industrial policy bad?
State failure is blamed for many policy errors, this is especially true for industrial
policies. For this reason it is necessary to carefully survey state failure and to draw
attention to the dangers of excessive state intervention.
It must be remembered that sectors receive economic help through the system of
political patronage, i.e. because various policy actors (politicians and civil servants)
have personal business interests. Thus when taking decisions they are not neutral and
behave in a manner which reflects the preferences and limitations they face. This non-
neutrality of public decision making leads to failures called state failures and they are
frequently noted as the main reason for failures of industrial policy. The non-
neutrality of politicians is due to:
a) Politicians have a short time horizon and are biased towards decisions which
give results within their mandate. Since industrial policy is by nature a long term
policy, restructuring is frequently postponed or reduced to hastily assembled short
term measures.
b) The state's reaction to markets and market changes is slower than the markets
themselves, furthermore the state is slow to adapt policies to changing conditions. In
addition the state is inert and susceptible to paper pushing where documents arepassed from one bureaucratic table to another without any action being taken.
Controls are difficult to organize because parliament gets relevant facts with a time
lag so that it takes its decisions with imperfect information.
c) Narrow interest groups can dominate state intervention and tailor it to there
own agenda. Once the state awards a privilege to an interest group it is difficult to
take it away. The interest group "captures" the intervention and is not willing to
relinquish control. As a result powerful interest groups can divert state intervention
towards their personal advancement and away from the public interest.
d) State interventionism can provide an incentives to firms to redirect part of
their profits into rent seeking activities, e.g. into lobbying or pay-offs for civil
servants. This transforms their hard budget constraint into a soft one. Business results
are then not market determined but a result of negotiating terms with the state. The
distribution of state aid then becomes a result of the relative strength of participants in
the negotiating process. Usually in this process large firms, strategic regions and
strong sectors are in a better position to attract aid than small and weak agents.
e) Asymmetric information is crucial in the process of distributing aid and
controlling policy implementation. Asymmetric information leads to the principal-
agent problem. The agent in this case is the firm and potential aid recipient while the
state is the principal. The agent has complete information about developments at firm
level and can fix his reports and accounts to attract greater aid, e.g. increase his costs
above actual ones. The principal is the politician or civil servant who either does not
have the necessary information or lacks the motivation to delve deeper into the
information provided by the agent. As a result subsidies are usually larger than
required and the system has built into it an excess of subsidies.
The effect of state failure is that state intervention leads to a less efficient economy.
By deforming relative prices in a way that prices do not reflect scarcities it influences
the flow of resources and leads to their less efficient distribution. In 1983 Ramagopal
Agarwala showed in a World Bank’s  study that the greater the price distortions (i.e.
the greater their discrepancy from market prices) the greater is the impact on
decreasing the rate of growth, the propensity to save and the efficiency of investments
(World Bank, 1983) South Korea is one of the few economies which managed to
combine a high rate of state intervention with a low level of price distortions and high
rates of growth.3. Applied research on industrial policy
Empirical research should contribute to greater understanding of the costs and
benefits of state intervention. Such research is, however rare. This is due to the low
transparency of most subsidies while their wide range of economic effects make it
difficult to collect all the relevant data required for a comprehensive analysis. In spite
of this some research results require reporting.
In Western Germany state aid was almost exclusively awarded to sunset industries.
This aid, however, did not lead to their comeback. The most successful sectors (with
regard to export potential) were those which did not receive any aid. The failures
inherent in helping sunset industries are part of the results derived from research
conducted in Australia by the Center for International Economics. The same source
concludes that stopping aid to the coal industry (which in 1987 received 10.6 billion
DM) would increase German GDP by 38 billion DM while net employment would
rise by 157.000 jobs (Commission of the EC, 1991).
In Japan the MITI’s technocrats were not more successful in picking winners (Beason
and Weinstein, 1993). The intricate network of aid offered by MITI ended up in slow
growth sectors. Like in Germany the Japanese "wise" technocrats chose and aided
failing industries. The most recent research results seems to indicate that targeted
industrial policy did not contribute to high Japanese growth rates. Long term
industrial policy could have, perhaps, even further raised growth rates.
Numerous studies attempt to find a justification for state aid to chosen sectors.
Baldwin and Krugman in 1987 studied the costs and benefits of state aid, especially
that of Germany and France, to the Airbus project (Ford and Suyker, 1990). State
support enabled Airbus to compete with Boeing in the market for wide bodied jets.
The economies of scale in producing wide bodied jets is so big that there was a danger
that Boeing could end up as their sole producer. Even though this would minimize
costs it would also earn Boeing monopoly rents. Under such conditions Airbus's
market entry, even with subsidies, possibly transferred part of this rent to Europe
thereby increasing Europe's welfare. Since the full extent of subsidies was never made
public Baldwin and Krugman's work estimated them at 1.5 billion USD in 1974
dollars. The authors conclude that such a policy was not successful even from theEuropean point of view. They calculated that even with a zero discount rate the
present value of the Airbus project is negative. America is also a looser because
Boeing's loses following Airbus's entry are larger than the benefits of US passengers
resulting from fare reductions (which in turn resulted from greater competition and
lower prices for planes).
In their 1988 study Soltewedel et al. analyze shipbuilding subsidies in the European
Union (Commission of the EC, 1991). These subsidies were very high: France and
Italy subsidized up to 50% of production costs of ships, Denmark, the Netherlands
and Great Britain up to 30% and Belgium and Germany around 20%. In terms of
production and export volume it seems that subsidies had a positive effect in their first
year but in the long term there was a negative relationship between subsidies and
production levels.
In recent years shipbuilding subsidies have been falling in the European Union. Aid to
this sector in 1988-90 equaled 33.8% of its value added and in 1990-92 fell to 14.6%
of value added. The front runners in the reduction of subsidies are France, Italy, Great
Britain and Portugal (Commission of the EC, 1995).
The aid to sunset industries depends on the cause of their decline. The lag can be a
result of unfavourable market conditions and thus temporary, or a consequence of
loosing comparative advantages and hence permanent. State aid can be justified in the
case of temporary lags by the need to provide respite, bridge the slack demand period
and maintain production and employment levels during the brief downturn. The
strategy can be further defended by the fact that when the cycle picks up further state
aid will not be necessary. In real life it is, however, often very difficult to determine
whether policy makers are dealing with a short term lag of secular downturn. In most
OECD economies a large part of state aid is channeled into sunset sectors (especially
shipbuilding and the steel industry) and not into sectors facing short term decline.
Such state aid has not been instrumental either in preventing extensive layoffs of
workers or in the industry regaining its competitiveness. The opposite seems true. By
tying down resources in sectors facing a secular downturn and by artificially
maintaining high wages and profits in them the policies hampered required
restructuring. In this way many countries (e.g. England and Sweden for textiles,France for coal and steel) did not want to admit their lasting loss of comparative
advantages in some sectors and embarked on the path of providing large subsidies in
the hope that these industries would regain their competitiveness and find a market
niche. This approach postponed reallocation of resources into more profitable
employment while lay offs were delayed but not prevented. Furthermore, artificially
high wages in protected industries made new employment in other sectors more
difficult and hence led to even greater unemployment.
Subsidies to sunset industries need not always have such negative results. The
Japanese experience points to the importance of timing and determining precisely
when a sector or industry starts its decline (Trebilcock, Chandler, Howse, 1990). Thus
they quickly and correctly estimated when their textile, shipbuilding and coal industry
started its secular downturn and understood that further subsidies would not bring
about a reversal. It took other economies a long time (France is the best example) to
realize that they were not dealing with a short term temporary phenomena but a
secular downturn and act accordingly. Japan is considered the pioneer in the
introduction of formalized state aid aimed at subsidizing exit from declining
industries. By facing up to market changes the Japanese state decided to use funds to
aid firms leaving sunset industries. The purpose of these funds is to reduce the exit
costs which would otherwise be borne by the workers and employees. The funds
themselves are used for subsidizing a phased exit and worker re-qualification
programs. Even though exit subsidies in sunset industries do have disadvantages most
authors consider them the most appropriate form of industrial policy for declining
industries. Such policies seem to achieve a quick re-allocation of resources along lines
dictated by comparative advantages and lead to least efficiency loses.
4. Croatia and  restructuring
Since the nineties Croatia has been in an economy in transition which has
deconstructed its socialist economic system and is building a market economy. After
successfully achieving macroeconomic stabilization restructuring remains on the top
of the agenda. The central question is how to achieve economic restructuring and
what should be the economic role of the state in this process. Restructuring policies
and the experience of market economies can make a significant contribution inanswering these questions. At the same time Croatia has some specific features which
must be taken into consideration. They are related both to the transition and to the
beak up of former Yugoslavia. The Croatian state faces a number of problems:
a) Extensive resources are blocked in certain sectors. These sectors were chosen
according to the economic principles espoused by selfmanaging socialism and are not
a result of market driven resource allocation. Were they to be suddenly subjected to
market forms these sectors would be in great difficulty. Probably such exposure
would result in major excess capacity with sudden and large worker lay-offs. The
state must wisely manage the exposure of these sectors to markets so as to minimize
the costs of sudden closures.
b) The state is faced with the "stock-flow" problem. On the one hand resources
are blocked in sectors which would not "survive" sudden price and foreign trade
liberalization while on the other large financial resources are necessary for new
investments. With insufficient domestic savings and poor foreign investment it is
difficult to create the needed funds in the short term.
c) With a lot of capital still remaining in state ownership ongoing privatization
will require the guiding hand of the state. Decisions must be taken regarding the
extent of privatization, i.e. which firms to privatize and which to keep in state
ownership.
d) States in transition economies have tasks additional to those existing in the
West. They must create a complete and consistent legislative system of business laws,
they must create market institutions, develop financial information systems and the
real estate market, regulate trade, transport and communications, develop an
accounting and revision system and transform state owned companies in market
oriented ones.
e) The Yugoslav market is lost while that in the former Comecon has partially
been lost. At the same time it is difficult to enter new markets. In the meantime
productive capacity remains idle, output is falling and unemployment in them rising.
f) After the end of the war and the liberation of most of the country a new aspect
of restructuring entered the agenda. The newly liberated areas need to be
reconstructed, repopulated and new plants built. In addition there are numerous war
damaged plants in areas which were not occupied. The role of the state under such
circumstances must be carefully analyzed.All the specific features mentioned indicate that state intervention will continue to be
necessary in Croatia. The state in transition is facing the challenge of designing the
most appropriate model through which to influence markets.
5. What form should Croatia's industrial policy take?
It has been reiterated in this report that targeted industrial policy does not lead to the
results expected. With the exception of Taiwan and South Korea few countries have
achieved favourable results with a targeted industrial policy. During the eighties these
policies were largely abandoned (New Zealand in 1984, Chile in 1973-84, Austria in
1986, Germany in the mid 80's) in favour of a different development strategy. On the
macroeconomic level this strategy is largely made up of internal economic
liberalization connected to opening markets and export expansion, reducing protection
levels and increasing the competitiveness of domestic production. Macroeconomic
stability with low inflation rates, low unemployment rates and a low fiscal deficit
provide additional macroeconomic goals which are not always easy to achieve.
In the light of these experiences industrial policy has shifted from targeted policy
measures to horizontal policies supporting key inputs. Following this Croatia should
also stress horizontal policy measures in its industrial policy. In that context the
following areas are especially important:
a) State investments into infrastructure, especially transport and communications.
b) Training and re-qualification programs for workers leaving industries being
shut down. Developing training programs for unemployed young workers and
programs for the eradication of long term unemployment. Special attention should be
given to developing managerial, marketing and sales skills.
c) Develop new forms of support for research and development activities, incite
the diffusion of technological know-how and support the development of international
research and science exchange.
d) Create a network of agencies designed to support small and medium sized
firms which would disseminate information regarding financial opportunities, new
technologies, educational openings, exports, etc. In this way market entry costs arereduced and small and medium sized firms can enter activities which they otherwise
could not pursue.
e) Design policies influencing new market structures. In this area numerous
policies are available: policies designed for small and medium sized firms, control
and monitoring of take overs and mergers, anti-monopoly policies, incentives for
foreign investments, etc.
f) Further develop environmental protection by internalizing external
diseconomies (e.g. by taxing polluters) and regulating pollution emitting industries
(e.g. requiring the use of filters).
g) Privatize and reform state owned companies. In the latter case extremely
important policies are those aimed at increasing control over management, increasing
market exposure and motivating managers for better business results.
h) Approach to loss making industries. International experience has shifted from
subsidizing them to subsiding the costs of their market exit. Japan provides a good
example in this respect. This approach is especially important because Croatia is
facing firm rehabilitation and restructuring.
i) Regional policies do not require any special policy measures. Following the
experiences of the European Union the application of the above mentioned policies
should provide incentives for endogenous regional development. The policies aimed
at the newly liberated areas should also follow this example.
The implementation of these policies depends on some preconditions. These are:
a) Macroeconomic stability which decreases business uncertainty and thereby
makes economic accounting possible, both for profits and losses.
b) A competent and independent pro-market oriented state whose interventionism
will not distort relative prices too much. A competent administration made up of
capable, educated and motivated civil servants supported by a transparent and
democratic political system. An independent state implies that it is not under the
influence of various interest groups but that it independently and responsibly takes
decisions and implements them.
c) Continuous dialogue of all main economic actors can significantly contribute
to restructuring. Examples of this are provided by the Austrian experience of
Sozialpartnertschaft where government, trade unions and employers cooperate, or theNew Zealand system of Business Round Table which encompasses executives of the
largest industrial firms, other influential social figures and academic economists as
well as by MITI's discussions on "visions" in Japan.
d) The development of a stable institutional framework. This must include
building of state regulations and legal system which provide a clear and stable
framework to the maintenance of financial discipline.
The state has at its disposal various measures for implementing such an industrial
policy ranging from subsidies and tax benefits to privatization and deregulation. Each
of them has its costs and benefits which must be carefully considered when choosing
policies. It is advantageous if state intervention has the following four features:
a) it must be temporary,
b) it must be transparent,
c) it must be aimed at phased reduction of excess capacity and
d) it must distort relative prices as little as possible.
No single instrument satisfies all these positive characteristics. For example tax
benefits are much less transparent than direct subsidies or loans. Direct subsidies
often lead to an administrative staff which implements them and which can come
under the influence of interest groups which make it difficult to control them.
Transparency is an especially important feature of any industrial policy. The state
must conduct an industrial policy according to fixed rules and not base it on
discretionary decisions. When the state defines clear rules it guarantees transparency,
discipline in applying the rules and makes monitoring and control easier. Furthermore
in this way the state introduces a climate which enables all participants in the
economic game (firms as well as consumers) to perform according to rational
economic behavior based on clear expectations concerning the future.II. SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES
Austria
Austrian economic policy generally and industrial policy in particular is under the
influence of the tri-partite system (Sozialpartnerschaft). Under this policy
arrangement government, trade unions and employees cooperate to maintain
economic stability.
Among OECD economies Austria is considered as the economy with the largest
public sector and the highest share of nationalized industries. In 1989 32.8% of all
firms were state owned. State firms are managed through a special holding company
set up to manage nationalized industry: OEIAG (Oesterische Industries Holding
Aktiengesellschaft, founded in 1970). This company is composed of seven holding
companies (for mining, machine tool industry, electronics, ferrous metals, non ferrous
metals, oil and chemical industry) with 350 firms (EIU,1994).
The Austrian government has been mostly concentrated on one aspect of industrial
policy, i.e. policies designed to provide financial support to nationalized industries
with the purpose of maintaining high employment.
But the economy started to face major economic problems during the eighties
(including an especially high fiscal deficit). This forced the government to reduce
financial support and re-examine the role of industrial policy. As a result in 1989
policies designed to provide financial support for nationalized industries were
abandoned and replaced by policies aimed at developing new technologies, energy
conservation and environmental protection. At the same time subsidies were reduced
so that the share of state subsidies fell from 3.2% of GDP in 1987 to 2.4% in 1990
(OECD,1990). Presently OEIAG is being reorganized, economic activities are being
internationalized (especially links with the EU which are increasing) and many firms
are being privatized.
ChileChile abandoned strong state interventionism and embarked on economic
liberalization programs. The change started in Chile in 1973 during the period in
which General Pinochet’s dictatorship was replacing President Allendes socialism.
Under the influence of new neoliberal ideas expounded by the Chicago School and
Milton Friedman Chilean economists concluded that the consequences of market
failure were more disastrous than those of state failure. As a consequence Chile
replaced its import substitution strategy with market allocation of resources and thus
was transformed from one of the most protected economies in the world into one of
the least protected ones.
Although the change was supported by expensive credits from abroad, inflation was
stabilized, exports increased, prices started reflecting scarcities and the Chilean
economy became competitive and open to world markets. During the 1977-1981
period GDP growth rates increased to 8% (Bruno et al. 1991). At the same time real
incomes fell, unemployment increased, expensive credits led to high indebtedness and
economic inequality increased.
But the Chilean neoliberal experiment which took place during a political dictatorship
led to changes due to which a new awareness developed. This is that less state
intervention and market allocation of resources was unavoidable for an economy to
find its way to the international markets.
European Union
Industrial policy in the European Union has gone through three phases. The first
started when three structural funds were established, i.e. the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the
European Social Fund (ESF). Their role was to help economic restructuring of EU
countries. The second phase started during the eighties. At that time the EU decided to
base its growth on endogenous regional growth in different EU regions. This idea was
based in the notion that growth must start in the regions themselves and not be
managed by a European bureaucracy. Resources from the structural funds are now
used for inciting internal, endogenous growth in EU regions. The nineties mark a third
stage. The change brought into the limelight the idea that the Union is lagging behindUS and Japanese development and that industrial policy should be aimed at increasing
the competitiveness of the EU's industry.
The problem with EU's industrial policy has always been that it is made up of
numerous documents with many agreed goals, recommendations,  and priorities of
which only a small number have been implemented in practice. The main barrier
remains in the strong feeling of national identity among member states and the fear of
transferring aspects of national sovereignty to the supranational EU. It is perceived
that this would imply the loss of political power and possible dangers for the national
economy.
Germany
Twice in its recent history the German economy was faced with reconstruction with
the help of significant external financial assistance. The first time was after the
Second World War when the German economy received substantial funds through the
Marshall Plan. The second time was when large West German capital injections
poured into East Germany during its transition to a market economy.
How were the capital inflows used in each occasion? Post War reconstruction took
place in the environment of a social market economy (Soziale Markwirtshaft). In this
environment market forces had a greater influence on the economy than public policy.
The German principles of a social market economy reflected the approach that
structural change should take place under market conditions but that the state would
help solve the social problems restructuring creates. In spite of these intentions the
state did resort to industrial policy measures such as tax benefits and direct financial
transfers which would allocate resources into such sectors as transport, agriculture,
housing, shipbuilding, coal production and banking. But during the eighties Germany
started abandoning an industrial policy which directly targets chosen sectors in favour
of one aimed at both research and development as well as providing incentives for
starting new small and medium sized firms.  The targeted industrial policy did not
prove to be a good policy.
German unification represent a special challenge in which the highly protected East
German economy had to be exposed to market criteria. To enable a least painfultransition East Germany received transfers from West Germany which in 1991
amounted to 50% of East German 1989 GDP (Federal Office of Trade Information,
1991). Through transfers coupled to investment and tax benefits the federal
government's aid to the new regions was funneled into transport, telecommunications,
housing construction, environmental protection, education research and development
and support for new production programs (i.e. mostly horizontal industrial policy
measures). After five years and in spite of many difficulties (especially high
unemployment) the economic life in former East German regions has improved and in
1994 it registered a GDP growth rate of 12.4% (OECD, 1995).
Japan
Japanese industrial policy is dominated by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, MITI. The ministry was established after the Second World War.
MITI includes a Commission for Industrial Structure which is made up of
representatives of the state, industry, workers, academia and consumer groups. The
role of the Commission is to study various questions related to industry and define
which new industrial structures are most preferable for the national economy. This
"vision" represents a kind of indicative plan and is published and widely distributed
with the aim of leading to a social consensus regarding industrial structure. MITI's
"vision" is not a formal plan and it does not give specific goals for individual
industrial sectors. Instead is outlines priorities (types of products and processes which
should be favoured).
In the beginning MITI's role was to control the distribution of loans. Over time MITI
transformed and its resources were increasingly used for collecting information,
determining economic priorities, promoting the private sector and acting as an
intermediary between the domestic and international economy. But MITI also took
decisions regarding the distribution of subsidies, direct support to research, soft loans
with low interest rates and tax benefits. In addition to helping "sunset industries"
eliminate excess capacity at various times is supported different industrial sectors
such as: shipbuilding, heavy industry, petrochemicals, research and development in
the automobile industry, knowledge intensive industries (computer production), etc.But recent research has indicated that MITI's role was not as benign as was thought
for many years.
New Zealand
New Zealand provides a very interesting example of an economy which changed from
one of the most highly regulated economies in the world to one of the most liberal
ones. The change took place during the eighties, more precisely it started in 1984
when the Labour party came to power and Sir Roger Douglas became the Minister of
Finance. He started implementing a completely different policy from the one hitherto
known in New Zealand. These economic policies were similar to the ones
implemented by the Reagan administration and because of this similarity are referred
to as "Rogernomics".
"Rogernomics" describes a strategy of replacing state intervention and a welfare state
by free markets and policies in which the ultimate users must pay for the services they
enjoy. Furthermore it replaces a highly regulated economy with a highly deregulated
economy. As a result export and production subsidies for many products were cut off,
soft loans were abolished, reduced tariffs replaced quotas, the state retreated from
commercial ventures and there was widespread privatization. While state aid during
the seventies averaged 2.3% of GDP as a result of "Rogernomics" in the eighties it
fell to less than 0.6% of GDP (Ford and Suyker, 1990). This industrial policy was
supported by macroeconomic policies. The government was clearly committed to
eliminating fiscal and monetary imbalances, i.e. of stopping inflation and reducing the
fiscal deficit.
For these policies and reforms the ruling party enjoyed the necessary support in all
social classes. Special support came from the Business Round Table. This institution
included managers of the largest industrial firms, other notable businessmen and a
large number of academic economists.
The results of "Rogernomics" started showing themselves after 1993, i.e. almost a
decade after their implementation. Thus in 1994 GDP growth rate reached 6%
(Turkey was the only OECD economy with higher growth rates), inflation ratesstabilized around 1-2%, the trade deficit was low and the state budget in surplus. In
two areas the expected results did not materialize: interest rates remained high (they
are not falling below 8%) and unemployment rates are not decreasing fast enough
(they are still 8-9%) (OECD, 1994).
South Korea
South Korea offers the best example of an economy which achieved high growth rates
and a high level of economic development while relying both on selective state
interventionist policies and vigorous markets. In other economies selective industrial
policy almost regularly led to low growth rates. In Korea the opposite occurred since
Korea managed to achieve high growth rates with strong state interventionism. In the
years 1962-1993 Korea achieved one of the highest growth rates in the world since
the average yearly growth rate during the period was 8.5% (OECD, 1994).
South Korean state intervention was different from the usually used one. Instead of
protecting its industry from foreign competition and developing import substitution
South Korea used state interventionism for designing strong incentives for export
production. As early as 1965 economic policy actors in Korea decided to change their
development strategy from import substitution industrialization to a strategy based on
strong export development. The whole system of state intervention was aimed at
export growth. This policy goal was further supported both by a very flexible political
regime which maintained an environment for varied forms of state initiatives and a
stable macroeconomic environment.
The success of South Korean state interventionist policies was made possible because
these policies were envisaged as a system with a neutral aggregate effect on the
economy. As a result in spite of high state interventionism the South Korean economy
experienced extremely low levels of price distortions and high aggregate growth rates
(World Bank, 1983).
Taiwan
The Taiwanese experience is frequently referred to as the Far East economic miracle.
The Taiwanese economy has been experiencing high growth rates since 1952 together
with export expansion, price stability, high employment levels and a relativelyequitable income distribution. Real GNP in the 1952- 1990 period grew at an yearly
average of 8.8% and per capita GNP increased from 100 USD in 1952 to 8000 in
1990 (Kuo, 1994).
What industrial policy led to such impressive results? The choices made by
Taiwanese industrial policy did not lead it to chose "wrong industries", indeed it
managed to choose some very successful sectors which turned into winners: food
processing, textiles, electrical appliances, petrochemicals, metal industry, electronics
and machine production.
Many factors led to the Taiwanese success. Some of them are: the inherited
infrastructure left by Japanese colonization, the entrepreneurial talent which came
from the mainland China, aid from the US (largely as gifts), favourable cycles in the
world economy and Confucianism. Even though all these factors played an important
role there is another factor which more than the others led to the above average results
of the Taiwanese economy. This factor is the state. It was the state which combined
all the mentioned factors into a system where each one could make its largest
contribution so that they all together lead to the stable accelerated growth.
The Taiwanese state is best described as a strong state operating independently from
interest groups. In addition the Taiwanese state has a competent state bureaucracy
made up of dedicated and educated civil servants (largely migrants from mainland
China). At the same time the state is not in conflict with the market. Indeed the
opposite is true since it is a "market friendly" state, i.e. a state which managed to lead
and follow market trends. The Taiwanese example shows the extent to which a
autonomous and competent state is a prerequisite for implementing an efficient
industrial  policy which will result in accelerated growth.
Croatia
The choice of "national winners", i.e. selecting industrial sectors whose development
the state systematically supports and whose growth it stimulates, is not a feature of
Croatia's industrial policy. The state aid goes mainly to the ailing industries. The
influence of the state in the Croatian economy is largely confined to subsidies,
transfer payments, financial support from the state budget and tariff protection. SinceCroatian independence the state budget subsidies and transfers has been used for
agriculture as well as for the support of loss making firms, bank rehabilitation,
tourism, state railways and shipping companies. The subsidies are disbursed through
the relevant ministries.
The main forms of state intervention in agricultural production is the protection of
agricultural producers and consumers. The state achieves the former by buying
agricultural products and the latter through subsidizing the production of basic
agricultural products. The two main forms of state intervention in Croatian agriculture
are the price policy and subsidies.
Money from the state budget is also used for restructuring and financial rehabilitation
of selected firms. For the selected firms (usually these are the most indebted firms)
the support starts by financial rehabilitation, i.e. by applying certain criteria to deal
with the firm's debt problem. This is followed by planned financial restructuring and
introducing transparent creditor rights towards the firms creditors and banks.
The state directly supported shipbuilding in two ways. The first was by direct loans
for building ships and the second was by issuing "big bonds".
The state is also directly involved in bank rehabilitation and restructuring schemes.
Instead of giving loans the state has opted for a long term bank rehabilitation and
restructuring process. This process will run concurrently with the privatization,
restructuring and financial rehabilitation of socially and state owned firms.
State supports the tourist industry  through direct cost subsidies. These subsidies
cover part of the costs for domestic and foreign tourist transport to  some Croatian
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